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Exploring the Knoedler Gallery’s Premium Picture Market, 1872-1934 
Robert Jensen, University of Kentucky 
Abstract 
This paper was first delivered at the conference Art Dealers, America and the International Art 
Market, 1880-1930 sponsored by the Getty Research Institute, The Getty, Los Angeles, CA, January 
2018. The essay is based on research conducted at the GRI Special Collections’s archival holdings 
of materials belonging to the New York art gallery M. Knoedler & Co.  The paper outlines a 
quantitative methodology for approaching the Getty’s data set, which was created through the 
transcription of Knoedler’s 11 painting stock books covering the gallery’s operations from 1872 to 
its closing in 1970.  The paper explores the advantages of concentrating on the gallery’s premium 
picture market and discusses what can and cannot be learned from the information provided by the 
stock books. It explains why concentrating on the gallery’s purchases rather than sales best reveals 
the evolving tastes of American art collectors from the Gilded Age to the Depression.  Using only 
Knoedler’s high-end market, the paper demonstrates which artists and kinds of art the gallery most 
strongly invested in and how these investments changed over time. 
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Exploring the Knoedler Gallery’s Premium Picture Market 1872-1934 
Rationale 
The M. Knoedler and Co. Archive housed in the Special Collections of the Getty 
Research Institute (GRI) in Los Angeles has provided scholars with a unique window into the 
evolution of taste for European painting among American art collectors from the Gilded Age to 
the Great Depression.  The GRI took the remarkable step of transcribing the eleven stock books 
belonging to the Knoedler Gallery into a single data set as a means of making the stock books 
accessible online.   Getty scholars have subsequently used the data set to study such things as the 1
geographic distribution of American art collectors.  As robust as the existing work on this data 
has been, there are still many ways to use this data that have not yet been explored.  This paper 
takes one such tack.  It looks only at the most expensive pictures that the gallery sold from 1872 
to 1934, acting on the theory that we can understand more about American art collecting—at 
least in relation to the Knoedler Gallery—better when looking closely at their premium market 
than we can by taking a wholly inclusive approach, using all the transactions the gallery ever 
made over the entire years of its existence. 
Michael Knoedler, the firm’s founder, began his career working at the Adolphe Goupil 
Gallery in Paris.  When he established his New York City gallery in the early 1870s he largely 
featured paintings by contemporary artists that were annually showcased at the Paris Salon and at 
Goupil’s.  In essence, Knoedler established his New York business as the American outlet for 
Goupil’s stable of artists, which then included such Salon luminaries as Ernest Meissonier, 
William Bouguereau, and Léon Gérôme.  By trading in contemporary French Salon art, the 
 The unedited version of this data set have been posted to GitHub at https://github.com/thegetty/1
provenance-index-csv. 
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Knoedler Gallery was able to establish its American reputation as a major and reliable conduit 
for importing European art into the United States.  As American tastes evolved, Knoedler 
disengaged from Salon art in favor of French pastoral landscapes and peasant imagery.  Late in 
the century, the gallery began to invest significantly in Old Master paintings, representing 
multiple nationalities and historical periods.  These investments probably mark the high point of 
the gallery’s existence, spanning roughly from the mid-1890s through the First World War.  It 
was certainly when the gallery made its greatest profits and was the most important commercial 
agent for European art in the United States.  The gallery’s direction began to change again in the 
1920s, when Knoedler’s turned to the market for French Post-Impressionist and Modernist 
painting.  It is indicative of the popularity of such art with American collectors in the 1920s that 
Knoedler’s would become engaged with French modernism, even though the gallery’s 
involvement came long after other American commercial galleries had been active in this area. 
The Knoedler Gallery’s transitions from Salon artists to French pastoral painters to Old 
Masters to modernist French painters closely paralleled the creation of the great post-Civil War 
American art collections.  Over time, American collectors would donate their paintings, many 
of which were acquired through Knoedler’s, to create the initial core of some of America’s 
foremost art museums.  Knoedler’s commitment to modern French art in the 1920s also 
paralleled the development of some important “house” museums in the U.S., such as the 
original Barnes Foundation in Merion, Pennsylvania and the Phillips Gallery in Washington 
D.C., collections that often combined modern French painting with the Old Masters.  
Through a quantitative examination of Knoedler’s premium market, this paper 
demonstrates how the prices that Knoedler’s paid for their pictures, as well as the volume of 
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acquisitions they made in certain artists, reflect such things as the dramatic shift in appreciation 
by American collectors for 19th-century Barbizon painters, for artists like Camille Corot, in favor 
of modern French art.  For example, chart #1 traces the plummeting prices for Corot’s pictures 
that began during the First World War and continued throughout the 1920s.  The chart also shows 
Knoedler’s sudden burst of investment in the art of the French Post-Impressionists.  Knoedler’s 
acquisitions of Post-Impressionist painting obviously did not gradually evolve over time.  Since 
the gallery had resisted getting involved in this market long after other American commercial 
galleries had begun selling modernist French painting, the prices for Post-Impressionist pictures  
Chart 1.  Knoedler Gallery purchase prices of 1st and 2nd generation Barbizon landscape 
painters compared to the Gallery’s purchases of Post-Impressionist artists 
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were already quite high, driven by several decades of competition among American and 
European art collectors for this art.2   
Looking at Knoedler’s premium market quantitatively provides an important supplement 
to the qualitative research that has been done on Gilded Age art collecting, such as Cynthia 
Saltzman’s Old Masters, New World, which treats among other things the close relationship 
between collectors like Henry Clay Frick and the Knoedler gallery.3  The quantitative study of 
the Knoedler premium picture market provides a broader view of the steady transformation of 
the gallery’s market behavior, mirroring changes in American tastes as its collectors became 
more sophisticated consumers of European art.  One can see in large terms the significant 
financial investments of many of the Gilded Age “robber barons” in art. 
Methodology 
To understand the Knoedler’s premium market using the Getty data first required the 
creation of a cleaned version, adjusted for errors in transcription, for the sale and resale of the 
same painting, and for the same painting being registered in multiple stock books.  Once 
duplications were eliminated there remained approximately 38,000 distinctive paintings 
represented in the Knoedler set.  The gallery’s activities were then limited only to the years 
between the 1870s and 1934, based on the view that the Depression coincided with the end of 
the gallery’s glory years.  Although Knoedler’s persevered until 1970 and still made 
 The chart also shows how all investments that Knoedler made in art acquisitions suffered during the 2
Great Depression.  But we know that the Post-Impressionist market recovered later to reach spectacular 
heights, whereas the taste for Barbizon painting never again achieved the status and the comparable price 
tag this art experienced at the end of the 19th century.
 Cynthia Saltzman, Old Masters, New World: America’s Raid on Europe’s Great Pictures, (NY: Viking, 3
2008).
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significant premium art transactions, the postwar market was demonstrably different than what 
preceded the Depression.   
The second major bracketing of the Getty data set was to confine the data to only 
premium pictures.  A rationale for focusing on premium pictures is that this market most strongly 
expressed the conspicuous consumption of art that characterized this era.  Buying expensive 
works of art was used to signal social status, primarily among collectors but also for a growing 
middle-class art public.  Huge sales of paintings by Rembrandt and Vermeer made headlines 
then much as they do today.  Collectors wished to demonstrate their connoisseurship, 
sophistication, taste, and financial capacity.  Conversely, dealers like Knoedler’s also benefited 
from selling premium pictures.  Costly sales maintained the gallery’s prestige among its rival 
galleries.  As with the collectors, premium sales signaled the sophistication, knowledge and 
aesthetic judgement that promoted consumer trust in all the art the gallery handled.  And, of 
course, the profits that could be had from just one major sale might equal hundreds of low dollar 
sales.   
The premium market also helped the Knoedler gallery to “signpost” their transactions.  In 
other words, Knoedler’s could emphasize specific values about art works being offered for sale, 
while downplaying other significant information that might detract from the valuation of the art. 
Let’s take the example of Camille Corot, the gallery’s most popular artist.  The firm purchased 
during the period surveyed 152 Corot paintings at premium prices and 351 pictures overall—
many of these other pictures costing just under the premium threshold.  That’s a lot of Corots, 
most of which were landscapes, and with comparatively little differences among them in their 
treatment of subjects or in their quality of execution.  The firm must have represented to 
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Knoedler’s clients every one of these Corot paintings as exceptionally fine examples of the 
artist’s work; their significance stretched so much that the buyer was willing to pay more for his 
or her Corot than even for a prized old Master artist such as Meindert Hobbema or small scale 
Rembrandts, despite how common the Corot paintings were in the gallery’s inventory.  Overall, 
and without adjusting for inflation, the gallery committed more than $2,300,000 for the premium 
Corot paintings alone.  They made more than a million dollars in return on their eventual sale. 
Adjusting for inflation, this sum would be approximately equivalent to well over thirty million 
dollars today.4 
There are obvious financial incentives for stretching.  How far one can exaggerate such 
value is constrained by the need to maintain trust between all parties in the transaction.  This 
certainly was at play with the Corot market.  Stretching might also characterize large sections of 
Knoedler’s Old Master picture market.  Many of the American collectors were self-made 
individuals who lacked substantial formal education, especially art education.  With such an 
audience, the artist’s name might matter more than the inherent qualities of the work collected.  
At least within the Knoedler premium market, a conservative approach to collecting dominated, 
but once the collector decided on a purchase, it might be for an extravagant sum, often paying 
much more for the painting than the gallery had.  Consider that only 229 artists out of the 
 Of course in today’s superheated art market, some of Corot’s paintings are once again selling for high prices.  In 4
2018 the artist’s “Venise, vue du Quai des Esclavons,” from 1845, sold at a Christie’s auction for the artist’s record 
price of $9,009,844, which would have the approximate value of $300,000 in 1900.  However, Corot’s pictures are 
just as likely to be valued significantly less today than they were in 1900.  For example, $150,000 was the highest 
price Knoedler was ever able to sell a Corot.  In 1917 they sold “Nymphs and Fauns” (1870) to a William 
Butterworth from Moline, Illinois.  The painting is now in a private collection.  When last auctioned in 2011, the 
painting sold for $422,500 or what would have been approximately equivalent to $24,000 in 1917.  See the 
Christie’s auction results for 12 October 2011, Sale 2521 “19th Century European Art.”
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entire history of Western painting are represented in the premium Knoedler market from 1871 to 
1934.  Eliminate artists by whom Knoedler sold three or less pictures and the total number of the 
gallery’s premium picture artists falls to just 93.  These 93 artists represent the Knoedler canon 
of painters, whose works the gallery was confident of being able to sell.  Of course, any 
gallery’s purchases would be limited by access and opportunities.  Knoedler’s agents went after 
artists and artworks that came on the European market.  Nonetheless, the data reveals that they 
concentrated their activities where they were confident in sales, regardless of the specific 
painting they were trying to sell.  During the period surveyed the gallery sold ten or more 
premium works by fifty-two artists, and twenty or more premium pictures by just thirty-two 
artists (see Table #1). 
Table 1. Most frequently acquired artists by Knoedler Gallery to American collectors   
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 In order to work with the financial information contained in the Knoedler stock books 
one has first to understand what they represent and what kinds of information they express.  The 
gallery’s daily expense accounts and financial ledgers are not part of the Knoedler archive at the 
GRI.  Undoubtedly they have not survived.  In their absence the stock books (fig. #1) cannot be 
treated as wholly reliable sources of information regarding financial transactions.  The gallery 
did not use these books for accounting purposes and we should not look at the financial 
Figure 1. Page from the Knoedler Stock Book for January 1928 
information books.  But the commission books are very extensive in their own right and 
represented an important part of the gallery’s business.  And then there is the gallery’s 
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involvement in the print trade, which is also absent from the stock books.  Finally, the stock 
books rarely indicate works contained therein as if they were.  One can find in the Knoedler 
business correspondence references to transactions that never appear in the stock books.  
Operational expenses are also usually missing.  In the early years, works on commission are 
sometimes included in the stock the firm sold abroad.  Whatever we can glean from the stock 
book data is therefore just a part of the story of the Knoedler enterprise.   
In most cases, the stock books provide information about the artist, title, the presumed 
“purchase” price for the art work, who was its last owner, and who was its buyer, how much was 
paid for the work, and when these transactions occurred.  Often in the stock books the buyer is 
listed.  But it is not unusual for the gallery to indicate a sale without writing down the purchaser. 
Sometimes an entry will record the purchase price but no sales price or more rarely a sales price 
without a purchase price.  It is possible that in the former case the sales price is identical to the 
listed purchase price.  The profit, if any, from the sale might have been registered elsewhere in 
the gallery’s business papers.  In the latter case, when a sale price is listed without a purchase 
price, the gallery may not have considered it necessary to indicate both.  The firm may have 
acquired the painting question for a specific buyer at an already agreed price, so that purchase 
and sales prices were effectively the same.  One sees this, for example, in a number of expensive 
purchases Henry Clay Frick made through Knoedler’s.  Consequently, in most instances in the 
gallery’s high-end market, when the stock book entry lacks a “sales” price or lacks a “purchase” 
price, the listed price in one column is likely to be identical with the missing price in the other 
column. 
 10
For this project the purchase price was the most valuable entry in the stock books.  First, 
and most importantly, the “purchase” price as listed in the Knoedler stock books should be 
considered an index of the gallery’s appraised value for a work of art rather than its actual cost.  
In a great many cases the purchase price represents a professional appraisal of value, and not 
simply what a client might be willing to be for a given picture.  While very often the purchase 
price listed in the stock books represents what the gallery actually paid for the work (this is 
especially true of paintings obtained at auction), there are reasons we should not accept the listed 
purchase price at face value.   
Michael Knoedler imported not only the Goupil Gallery’s Salon artists but also Goupil’s 
business practices.  Knoedler’s stock books and Goupil’s are surprisingly similar in format.  He 
certainly imported other practices.  For example, we know that Goupil typically negotiated 
purchase and sales prices with his stable of artists.  One example is a contract that Goupil signed 
with the Italian painter Giuseppe de Nittis.   In exchange for the artist’s commitment to provide 5
the gallery with a certain number of paintings annually, the art would be given an annual stipend.  
That stipend would be repaid through the sales of his pictures.  When de Nittis submitted a 
picture to Goupil they would negotiate the painting’s “purchase” price, which represented in 
essence how much the artist in conjunction with the dealer thought they could get for the work.  
Once the picture sold the dealer would take half the proceeds and de Nittis would have the other 
half subtracted from his stipend debt.  Any amount paid over the purchase price would also be 
 See, for example, the contract Goupil negotiated with the Italian painter Giuseppe de Nittis.  The letter of 5
agreement has been reprinted in full in Paolo Serafini, La Maison Goupil et L’Italie (Musée des Beaux-Arts, 
Bordeaux, 2013), pp. 19-20. 
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split evenly between the gallery and the artist.  In this way, the purchase price was actually the 
base estimate of what the gallery and the artist thought they could get for a painting.   
This pattern of negotiating the purchase price based on an appraised expectation of its 
potential sale likely carried over into the acquisition of paintings in the resale market.  The stock 
books of both firms are extraordinarily neat, as if the entries were transferred from other sources
—sources where the intricacies of accounting would have been recorded.  This suggests that it 
was quite possible that both Goupil’s and Knoedler’s stock books might routinely record the 
original “purchase” price only after a successful sale.  Significantly, until the Depression years 
the Knoedler stock books very rarely record a financial loss on any premium transaction.  In fact, 
if works that the gallery acquired from Europe failed to sell, the common practice was to ship the 
paintings back to the Continent to either one of its branch galleries or to another gallery with 
whom Knoedler’s had partnered with in making the original acquisitions.  At this point the profit 
(or loss) from the sale of the painting disappears from the stock books.  Moreover, only a small 
number of premium pictures sat in the New York inventory unsold for more than two or three 
years.   
It was only when the stock books recorded the financial consequences of the stock 
market crash of 1929 that they became replete with revisions, especially crossed-out purchase 
prices.  What might have been originally listed as a $10,000 picture would be downgraded 
(crossed-out) to perhaps $8,000 and then maybe crossed out again and replaced with a $5,000 
purchase price before the painting finally found a buyer (see fig. #1).  Did the work actually cost 
the gallery nearly $10,000 in the first place or was such a figure merely the estimate of what the 
gallery thought was the floor price for which it could sell the work? 
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The stock books have other accounting peculiarities.  They rarely record within a 
purchase or sales price the cost of tariffs, shipping, framing, and any restoration work that may 
have needed to be done. This means that incidental costs involved in transatlantic shipping were 
incorporated within the listed purchase or sales price.  Occasionally, and usually in the case of 
complex transactions and multiple shareholders, incidental costs were listed as annotations.  The 
stock books usually express both purchases and sales in round numbers, whether it is 100 dollars 
or 10,000 francs or 5,000 pounds.  About 62% of the recorded premium purchase prices in the 
stock books are expressed in such numbers.  Only a little more than 5% of the entries include 
numbers after the decimal.  Typically these entries reflect works of art acquired in partnership 
with other galleries, where the division of the sale’s round number figure resulted in fractions.  
As noted, works bought at auction typically have an irregular purchase price.  But in cases where 
a painting was bought at auction in Europe or Great Britain, by the time it reached the United 
States the purchase price often acquired a round number, incorporating incidental expenses. 
 All this suggests that the various men working on behalf of Knoedler, including their 
British and European collaborators—a group that included other dealers—, demonstrated acute 
understandings of the potential market value in America of the paintings they sold.  Even if they 
may have retrospectively lowered purchase prices to show a profit, there does not seem to be any 
clear evidence that this was a general practice until the Depression.  One finds in the voluminous 
correspondence housed in the Knoedler archive numerous examples of purchase prices being set 
out in letters that are also reflected in the stock books. 
 Compared to purchase prices, sales prices represent too many variables.  Clients might 
significantly overpay for a picture.  Signalling seems to have been a regular pattern among the 
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leading American art collectors of the time such as Frick, Widener, and later Andrew Mellon.  
The sums such collectors paid for a painting often made it into the newspapers, the publicity 
thereby adding to the celebrity value of both the painting and of the collector.  Similarly, the 
profits Knoedler’s made on premium sales were never very standardized.  They ranged from as 
little as 2-3% profit to 50-60% profit over the listed purchase price, sometimes even more.   
Sales prices can tell us a lot about individual buyers.  But purchase prices expressed far 
more closely the professional evaluation of what the art trade considered a painting’s perceived 
worth, which is a more reliable index of the overall market value of a painting as it was 
understood at the time of acquisition than the price a client might be prepared to pay.  In short, 
we can think of the listed purchase price generally representing what the gallery decided was the 
reasonable price for a work based on a combination of acquisition cost, incidental costs, what 
they may have believed was the intrinsic value of a particular type of painting, and what they 
must have believed was the least price for which they could sell the painting profitably.   
Having settled on the purchase price as the value index, it was necessary to settle on a 
metric that would separate an expensive picture in Knoedler’s trade from the rest.  The problem 
is magnified by the fact that after more than a century of inflation it can be difficult to recognize 
an expensive price.  To the casual observer, the stock book prices by today’s dollars appear 
quite low.  In response, I developed a table that gave me a relative price index adjusted for 
inflation (table #2).6  I made the arbitrary decision that a painting that would cost more than 
$100,000 today adjusted for inflation, would separate the merely expensive paintings 
 Please bear in mind that prices adjusted for inflation only represent relative and not absolute values, since inflation 6
is never equally distributed over all commodities over time.  But the value of these adjustments is that they provide 
us with a better understanding of the nature and extent of Knoedler’s market activities.
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from what we might call today blue chip works of art, possessing universally-acknowledged 
importance, quality and financial worth.  However, as I became familiar with the distribution of 
purchase prices I changed my index to $120,000 in 2013 dollars.  Adjusted for inflation, this 
price equaled about $4,400 in the 1870s.  What I like about the base value of $4,400 for a 
Table 2.  Approximate historical equivalent of $120,000 in current (2013) U.S. dollars  
premium painting is that Knoedler’s recorded purchase prices generally fell either significantly 
below that figure or significantly above, but rarely near this price point.  And this remained true 
over time.  As it happened, if a collector was willing to spend as much as the equivalent of 
$120,000 (in 2013 dollars) for a particular painting, he or she was often willing to spend 
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significantly more.  While a painting that sold for perhaps $4,000 was still quite expensive, it 
nonetheless fell out of my premium category.  
 Having arrived at $4,400 as the base price for my premium picture market adjusted for 
inflation over time, I then converted the multiple currencies represented in the stock books into 
the single U.S. currency.  Fortunately exchange rates, like inflation, were very stable until the 
First World War (table #3).  It is only in the 1920s and early 1930s that one has to adjust these 
indices year by year (by using year-end averages).  After removing all the works acquired by the 
gallery for less than the equivalent of $120,000 in 2013 dollars, I arrived at a data set of  
Table 3.  Currency conversion rates over time (per year averages)  
1,623 entries for which I was fairly certain of the purchase price.   (Errors in transcription 7
offered an occasional challenge when the transcriber confused one currency for another.) 
 My edited version of the Knoedler data set is been posted to the Harvard Dataverse under the file name “Knoedler 7
gallery high end market 1871-1934.”
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 Having defined the premium picture market in Knoedler’s stock books I then further 
simplified the data in order to track changes in the pattern of the gallery’s purchases over time.  
Purchase dates were grouped into five year intervals and cultural descriptors for the type of art 
purchased were simplified.  For legibility sake, I kept the number of such cultural categories to  
Table 4. Premium pictures by culture and total purchases  
under twenty (table #4).  For example, I created descriptors within 19th century French painting 
such as 1st and 2nd generation Barbizon—I could also have also called this category  
19th-century French pastoral painters.  I divided the category between mid-century artists like  
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Jean-Francois Millet or Théodore Rousseau and later painters who followed in their tradition, 
like Léon Lhermitte, Jules Dupré and Charles Daubigny, so that I would be able to track the 
gradual shift in taste away from artists of Lhermitte’s stamp among American collectors to that 
of first-generation Barbizon painters like Rousseau.   In other cases, the cultural descriptors 8
bridged centuries, as in the categories of British landscapes and portraits—which were both 
extremely popular with American collectors and were purchased without respect to century of 
origin.  When categorization proved too elusive or too unique to the object, I gave the painting a 
generic categorization by century and country of origin, as in 19th-century British art, which 
consisted primarily of genre paintings.  French 19th century art was dominated by Romantic 
artists such as Eugène Delacroix.  The Old Masters category refers to any artist working before 
the 17th century. 
 As justification for these categories, they clearly express the narrow scope of tastes found 
among Knoedler’s clients in the high end market.  Remember that Knoedler’s premium market 
was dominated by a relatively small number of artists (see Table #1).  In the high-end of  
Knoedler’s business, these artists represented 79% of all the gallery’s premium purchases 
between 1871 and 1934.  
Results 
From the start, Knoedler’s standing in the American art trade, especially vis-a-vis 
European imports, was fundamentally based on trust.  At the upper end of Knoedler’s market, the 
 It is a not surprising feature of American collecting of 19th-century French painting that the celebrated Salon 8
painters working in the pastoral tradition were discovered first by American collectors and only later did they begin 
to acquire works by artists such as Millet and Rousseau.
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gallery catered to a clientele who typically were conservative in their tastes in art.  Most were 
probably not very expert in their knowledge of art.  They were typically members of the nouveau 
riche, self-made men who often rose from poverty to found banks and railroads and steel 
companies.  With relatively little formal education, it is quite likely that most were profoundly 
wary of being taken advantage of by foreign art dealers.  If they were to spend a lot of money on 
a painting, they depended on the Knoedler brand to deliver consistently high quality, “safe” art, 
specifically tailored to the clients’ limited range of taste.  This essential conservatism in the high-
end market is manifested in the dominant types of painting the gallery acquired over a period of 
more than fifty years.  It is also reflected in Knoedler’s overall market success. 
The gallery was conservative equally in the kind of works it acquired and the risks it took 
in acquiring them.  As I have already noted, they got into the market for modernist painting quite 
late compared to other American galleries.  Similarly, until the stock market crash in 1929, the 
losses from unsold paintings or paintings that sold well below the listed purchase price in their 
high-end business totaled less than $240,000 or about $3 ¼ million in contemporary dollars.  
That might seem like a lot of money until one compares it with the firm's profits.  When 
Knoedler’s investments in premium pictures are converted into their roughly equivalent 2013 
dollars (chart #2) one has a much better sense of the depth of the gallery’s involvement in this 
market.  The peak of $11 million plus in purchases before the World War becomes almost $280 
million in today’s dollars.  And even though their high-end market would never again be as great 
as it was before the War, in the 1920s the gallery still spent more than $150 million on paintings 
alone. 
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 Chart 2. Sum of Purchase Prices in 2013 dollars over five year intervals 
 Knoedler’s investment in premium pictures was not constant.  Qualitative studies have 
already described how the gallery in the late 1890s became increasingly committed to selling 
expensive old Master paintings.  Chart #2 graphically depicts the growing commitment to the 
upper end of the painting market.  It also shows the impact of the First World War, the post-war 
revival and then the effects of the stock market crash and Great Depression.  The gallery’s peak 
years of investing in high end painting immediately preceded the First World War.  Not 
surprisingly, in order to make such purchases the gallery increasingly relied on commercial 
partners with whom they shared the costs.  And although the volume and total investment 
declined after 1914, the percentage of shared purchases remain high through the 1930s.   
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  If we then reorganize these purchases (in 2013 dollars) by culture, tracked over five year 
intervals (chart #3) we can see that in the early years the Knoedler high-end market was 
dominated by pictures acquired in France.  Purchase transactions in those years, correspondingly  
Chart 3.  Total purchases in 2013 dollars per culture over five year intervals 
are predominately listed either in francs or in dollars (only six purchases were made in pounds 
prior to 1890).  In the 1890s the London market began to make a significant impact on Knoedler 
transactions, representing about 35% of foreign currency transactions. In the first decade of the 
20th century the presence of the London market in Knoedler acquisitions is even more dramatic, 
representing over 69% of foreign currency transactions.   Compared to the Paris purchases, the 9
Knoedler purchases in London were much more likely to be shared purchases with one or more 
 A great many purchases that were recorded in dollars were also made in Europe, but the gallery must have 9
negotiated the dollar price as part of the transaction.  Therefore the currency percentages must be considered relative 
and not absolute.  Nonetheless, they clearly support the growing dominance of the English market, corresponding in 
the vastly increased investment in British and Old Master paintings.
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London-based commercial galleries. What is a little surprising is that the London market 
continues to dominate premium purchases following the end of the First World War even though, 
of the three currencies, the French franc suffered the most in the post-war international money 
exchanges.  Paintings could have been acquired far more cheaply in Paris than in London and yet 
Paris provided fewer and fewer paintings directly to the New York gallery. This means that the 
connections the gallery had with the Parisian market were no longer providing paintings for 
which there was constant demand.  The decline of the Parisian market for Knoedler’s business 
began with the rise their involvement in the Old Master painting market, which largely flowed 
through London, and then their subsequent interest in Impressionism and then later Post-
Impressionism, where they relied on their English connections.  Parisian galleries like Durand-
Ruel’s tended to monopolize the market in Paris for French modernism.  To get their pictures, 
Knoedler’s was essentially forced to go through London. 
 Another factor in the dominance of the London market over Paris in Knoedler’s business 
operations was the growing interest in British portrait painting among American collectors, 
which became both by volume and by total investment the most popular high-end category in the 
Knoedler market.  Portraits were also favored in other cultural categories, especially 17th-
century Dutch, Flemish and Spanish painting, Goya, and a considerable portion of Old Master 
painting.  Given the size of the British portrait market, it is also noteworthy that, along with a 
few Gainsboroughs, the market was dominated by four artists, Hoppner, Raeburn, Reynolds, and 
Romney (see chart #4).  While individually Reynolds’ portraits were often the most costly, the 
total purchases in Romney portraits was consistently the highest, but nothing compares to the 
huge enthusiasm for Raeburn’s portraits during the second half of the 1920s. 
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Chart 4. Purchase prices of British portraitists compared 
 After portraits, French pastoral painting represented a collective investment of more than 
$159 million in 2013 dollars, more even than the gallery invested in 17th-century Dutch painting, 
which included important high dollar purchases of Rembrandts and Vermeers.  This difference 
expresses both the fact that Knoedler’s really only began to pursue 17th-century Dutch art after 
1900, but also that the gallery continued to find clients for its French pastoral paintings well into 
the 1920s.  In fact, as chart #5 demonstrates, if one combines the purchases for 1st and 2nd 
generation Barbizon/pastoral painting, Knoedler’s total investment outpaced what the gallery 
spent on 17th-century Dutch art, coming only after British portrait painting in the scale of their 
involvement in this market. 
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Chart 5.  Total Knoedler purchases per culture expressed in 2013 dollars 
  
 Having seen where Knoedler’s most heavily invested, it is interesting to know where and 
when the firm made its greatest profits.  Starting with 17th-century Dutch painting, Table #5 
breaks down profit margins into five year intervals, the total profit indicated in both original and 
2013 dollars and the average percentage of the margin during that five-year interval.  The gallery 
made an outrageous profit on such pictures in the first decade of the 20th century, although their 
investment was much less than in the five years preceding the First World War.  Overall, the 
gallery made more than $85 million in 2013 dollars on their high-end sales of 17th-century 
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Dutch pictures, with works by Rembrandt and Vermeer figuring most prominently among these 
sales.   
Table 5.  Profit margins for 17th-Century Dutch Painting 1900-1934 
Table 6.  Profit margins for 19th-century French Barbizon/Pastoral Paintings 1871-1934 
Years Purchase 
totals
Sales totals Margin totals Average 
margins
Margins in 
2013 dollars
1900-1904 $270,698 $429,300 $158,602 64.97% $4,229,387
1905-1909 $959,754 $1,775,764 $816,010 106.80% $19,983,918
1910-1914 $2,582,230 $3,632,753 $1,055,421 28.61% $25,847,044
1915-1919 $867,349 $1,348,776 $481,427 25.82% $9,628,540
1920-1924 $656,223 $1,211,059 $554,835 37.54% $6,658,020
1925-1929 $1,816,727 $2,997,991 $1,181,264 23.64% $16,108,144
1930-1934 $341,708 $525,000 $183,292 34.52% $2,566,526
Totals $7,494,689 $11,920,643 $4,430,851 41.52% $85,021,570
Years Purchase 
totals
Sales totals Margin totals Average 
margins
Margins in 
2013 dollars
1871-1879 $15,477 $23,000 $7,523 40% $205,173
1880-1884 $272,340 $371,559 $99,319 37% $2,708,700
1885-1889 $167,187 $259,900 $92,713 53.4% $2,528,536
1890-1894 $183,311 $234,600 $51,289 33.2% $1,398,791
1895-1899 $826,895 $1,147,444 $320,549 41.1% $8,742,245
1900-1904 $1,143,140 $1,848,543 $705,403 58.8% $18,810,746
1905-1909 $1,211,628 $1,775,516 $563,888 54.6% $13,809,501
1910-1914 $1,646,421 $2,380,840 $732,427 32.4% $17,936,986
1915-1919 $637,574 $1,023,451 $416,377 23.2% $8,327,540
1920-1924 $301,119 $454,215 $153,096 26.2% $2,143,701
1925-1929 $93,053 $139,126 $46,073 32.2% $628,268
1930-1934 0 0 0 0 0
Totals $6,498,145 $9,658,194 $3,188,657 39% $77,240,187
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 As I have already noted, it is remarkable how much and how long the gallery invested in 
19th-century French pastoral paintings. Table #6 demonstrates that Knoedler’s averaged nearly 
the same profit margin with such pictures as they did with 17th-century Dutch painting.  In fact, 
during the first decade of the 20th century it was the category that represented the gallery’s 
greatest profit.  Even during the five years before the First World War, when the gallery was 
committing so extensively to Old Master and 17th-century paintings, French pastoral paintings 
still managed to make almost $18 million in 2013 dollars for the firm.  
 In summary, one has to admire the gallery’s ability to avoid significant risk while reaping 
enormous profits.  At this level of investment the gallery was never a taste leader, whatever they 
may have done in their less expensive commercial activities.  It is similarly impressive that 
French pastoral paintings played such a major role in Knoedler’s premium market for such a long 
period of time.  I also found it intriguing that the investment in such painting only declined in the 
later 1920s and early 1930s when collectors moved on to purchasing Post-Impressionist works.  
Finally, one could argue that this data provides the basis for a powerful counter-narrative to the 
stories we usually tell about American art and culture from the turn of the century through the 
1930s—as well as how we see Knoedler’s role in disseminating European art to American 
audiences.
